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Abstract 
This study investigates how judgments of explanatory power 
are affected by (i) the prior credibility of a potential 
explanation, (ii) the causal framing used to describe the 
explanation, and (iii) the generalizability of the explanation. 
We found that the prior credibility of a causal explanation 
plays a central role in explanatory reasoning: first, because of 
the presence of strong main effects on judgments of 
explanatory power, and second, because of the gate-keeping 
role prior credibility has for other factors. Highly credible 
explanations were not susceptible to causal framing effects. 
Instead, highly credible hypotheses were sensitive to the 
generalizability of an explanation. While these results yield a 
more nuanced understanding of the determinants of 
judgments of explanatory power, they also illuminate the 
close relationship between prior beliefs and explanatory 
power and the relationship between abductive and 
probabilistic reasoning. 
Keywords: Explanation; Prior credibility; Causal framing; 
Generalizability; Abduction 
Introduction 
Explanation is a central concept in human psychology. It 
supports a wide array of cognitive functions, including 
reasoning, categorization, learning, inference, and decision-
making (Lombrozo, 2006; Keil & Wilson, 2000; Keil, 
2006). When presented with an explanation of why a certain 
event occurred, how a certain mechanism works, or why 
people behave the way they do, both scientists and 
laypeople have strong intuitions about what counts as a 
good explanation. Yet, more than sixty years after 
philosophers of science began to elucidate the nature of 
explanation (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948; Hempel, 1965; 
Salmon, 1989), the determinants of judgments of 
explanatory power remain unclear. 
In this paper, we present three experiments on factors that 
may affect judgments of explanatory power. Motivated by a 
large body of theoretical results in  epistemology and 
philosophy of science,  as well as by a growing amount of 
empirical work in cognitive psychology  (for respective 
surveys see Woodward, 2014; Lombrozo, 2012), we 
examined how judgments of explanatory power are affected 
by  (i) the prior credibility of a potential explanation, (ii) the 
causal framing used to describe the explanation, and (iii) the 
generalizability of the explanation. 
First we hypothesized that the prior credibility of a causal 
explanation predicts judgments of explanatory power. Thus, 
throughout all three experiments, we manipulated the prior 
credibility of different explanations, and examined the 
effects of this manipulation on explanatory judgments. 
Our focus on the prior credibility of causal explanation 
was motivated by the fact that most philosophical and 
psychological analyses of explanatory power agree that 
powerful explanations provide information about credible 
causal relationships. Credible causal information facilitates 
the manipulation and control of nature (Pearl, 2000; 
Woodward, 2003; Strevens, 2008) and plays distinctive 
roles in human psychology (Lombrozo, 2011; Sloman & 
Lagnado, 2015). For example, credible causal information 
guides categorization (Carey, 1985; Murphy & Medin, 
1985; Lombrozo, 2009), supports inductive inference and 
learning (Holyoak & Cheng, 2011; Legare & Lombrozo, 
2014; Walker et al. 2014), and calibrates metacognitive 
strategies involved in problem-solving (Chi et al., 1994; 
Aleven & Koedinger, 2002). 
Our second, related hypothesis was that presenting an 
explanatory hypothesis in causal terms predicts judgments 
of its explanatory power. Thus, we wanted to find out 
whether people’s explanatory judgments are sensitive to 
causal framing effects. 
The importance of this issue should be clear in the light of 
the fact that magazines and newspapers very often, even 
when it’s not warranted, describe scientific explanations in 
terms of causal language (e.g., ‘Processed meat causes 
cancer’ or ‘Economic recession leads to xenophobic 
violence’) with the aim of capturing readers’ attention and 
boosting their sense of understanding (Entmann 1993; 
Scheufele & Scheufele, 2010). By combining prior 
credibility and causal framing as predictors of judgments of 
explanatory power, Experiment 1 and 2 examined the 
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impact of causality on the explanatory power of scientific 
hypotheses. 
With Experiment 3, we tested the hypothesis that the 
generalizability (or scope) of a hypothesis determines its 
explanatory power. While the generalizability of scientific 
results is an obvious epistemic virtue that figures in the 
evidential assessments made by scientists, its relation to 
explanatory power is less clear. Previous psychological 
findings about the role of generalizability in explanatory 
reasoning are mixed. Read & Marcus-Newhall (1993) found 
that generalizability predicts explanatory judgments. Preston 
& Epley (2005) showed that hypotheses that apply to a wide 
range of observations are judged as more valuable. 
However, these studies involved no uncertainty about 
whether or not a causal effect was actually observed  (cf., 
Khemlani, Sussman, & Oppenheimer, 2011). So, whether or 
not generalizability is a robust determinant of explanatory 
judgment remains unclear. 
In summary, bringing together different strands of 
research from philosophy and psychology, our study asks: 
How do the credibility, causal framing, and generalizability 
of a hypothesis influence judgments of explanatory power? 
The pattern of our experimental findings supports the 
hypothesis that the prior credibility of a causal explanation 
plays a central role in explanatory reasoning: first, because 
of the presence of strong main effects on judgments of 
explanatory power, and second, because of the gate-keeping 
role it has for other factors. Highly credible explanations 
were not susceptible to causal framing effects. Instead, 
highly credible hypotheses were sensitive to the effects of 
factors which are usually considered relevant from a 
normative point of view like the generalizability of an 
explanation. 
Overview of the experiments and pre-tests 
To warrant the validity of the experimental material, we 
conducted a series of pre-studies, where participants 
evaluated different levels of causal framing, credibility, and 
generalizability. Materials which corresponded to high, low, 
and neutral levels of these three factors were implemented 
in the vignettes of our three experiments, either as 
independent variables or as control variables. 
Material evaluation and main experiments were both 
conducted online on Amazon Mechanical Turk, utilizing the 
Qualtrics Survey Software. We only allowed workers with 
an approval rate > 95% and with a number of HITs 
approved > 5000 to submit responses. Instructions and 
material were presented in English. 
 
Causal Framing 
A sample of N = 44 participants (mean age 30.5 years, SD = 
7.3, 28 male) from America (n = 27) and other countries 
rated eight brief statements, expressing relations between X 
and Y of the type “X co-occurs with Y”; “X is associated 
with Y”, and so on. Participants judged how strongly they 
agreed or disagreed that a certain statement expressed a 
causal relation between X and Y. Judgments were collected 
on a 7-point scale with options: "I strongly disagree" (-3), "I 
disagree", "I slightly disagree", "I neither agree nor 
disagree" (0), "I slightly agree", "I agree", "I strongly agree" 
(3). Based on participants’ ratings, we selected three types 
of statements for our main experiments: statements with a 
neutral causal framing (“X co-occurs with Y”), with a weak 
causal framing (“X is associated with Y”), and with a strong 
causal framing (“X leads to Y" and "X causes Y”). 
 
Prior Credibility 
We identified the prior credibility of different hypotheses by 
asking a new sample of N = 42 participants (mean age 30.7 
years, SD = 7.5, 16 male) from America (n = 29) and other 
countries to rate a list of 24 statements. Participants judged 
how strongly they disagreed or agreed that a certain 
hypothesis was credible. For all hypotheses, we used the 
phrasing "... co-occurs with..." to avoid the influence of 
causal framing. Based on participants’ ratings, we selected 
four statements to use in our main experiments: two were 
highly credible, two were highly incredible (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: The four hypotheses rated as least credible and as most 
credible. 
Credibility Hypothesis 
Low Eating pizza co-occurs with immunity to flu. 
Low Drinking apple juice co-occurs with 
anorexia. 
High Well-being co-occurs with frequent smiling. 
High Consuming anabolic steroids co-occurs with 
physical strength. 
 
Generalizability 
This pre-study included two questionnaires, which were 
administered to two different groups of participants. One 
questionnaire presented descriptions of the samples used in 
scientific studies, which varied with regard to the number of 
people involved. The other questionnaire presented sample 
descriptions that varied with regard to the type of people in 
the sample. 
Forty-two participants (mean age 33.5 years, SD = 10.8, 
27 male) from America (n = 38) and other countries  were 
presented with a list of six statements about a sample of a 
certain number of participants, e.g. "The study investigates 
five people"; "The study investigates 500 people".We found 
that the perceived generalizability of a study increased with 
the number of people in the sample of the study. 
A new group of N = 41 participants (mean age 33.0 years, 
SD = 9.7, 26 male) from America (n = 36) and other 
countries was presented with a list of nine statements about 
samples of particular types of people, e.g. "The study 
investigates a group of people who sit in a park"; "The study 
investigates a group of people who work at a university". 
However, focusing on the number instead of the type of 
people in the sample allowed for a neater distinction 
between narrowly and widely generalizable results. 
Therefore, we characterized generalizability as a function of 
the number of participants in the main vignettes of the 
experiment. 
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Vignettes of the Main Experiment 
All experiments were performed using a 2х2 (within-
subject) design with explanatory power as dependent 
variable and prior credibility of the hypothesis being one of 
the independent variables. The other independent variable 
was either causal framing, or generalizability. 
Participants were presented with four short reports about 
fictitious research studies. Two of these reports involved 
highly credible hypotheses, the other two reports involved 
incredible hypotheses. Two reports showed a high level of 
the other independent variable, while the other two reports 
showed a low level of that variable. 
Each vignette in our experiments followed the same 
format as in this sample vignette. 
 
Consuming anabolic steroids leads to physical strength 
A recent study by university researchers investigated the 
link between consuming anabolic steroids and physical 
strength. The researchers studied 240 persons. The level of 
physical strength was higher among participants who 
regularly consumed anabolic steroids than among the 
participants who did not regularly consume anabolic 
steroids. Family health history, age, and sex, which were 
controlled by the researchers, could not explain these 
results. The study therefore supports the hypothesis that 
consuming anabolic steroids leads to physical strength. 
 
In all experiments, we varied the level of prior credibility 
of a hypothesis. In Experiment 1 and 2, we also varied the 
causal framing and interchanged “leads to” with “causes” 
and “is associated with”, while we kept generalizability at 
its control. In Experiment 3, we varied the sample size 
(=generalizability) and controlled for causal framing by 
using the predicate “co-occurs with” in the headline and the 
conclusion. Participants were asked to rate our dependent 
variable: the explanatory power of the stated hypothesis for 
the results of the study. 
Experiment 1 and 2.                             
Credibility x Causal Framing 
Participants, Design, and Material 
Two-hundred-three participants (mean age 34.7 years, SD = 
10.5; 121 male) from America (n= 130), India (n = 67) and 
other countries completed Experiment 1 for a small 
monetary payment. A new sample of two-hundred-eight 
participants (mean age 34.56 years, SD = 9.97; 124 male) 
from America (n = 154), India (n = 43), and other countries 
completed Experiment 2 for a small monetary payment. 
In both experiments, participants were presented with 
four short reports about fictitious research studies along the 
lines of the above vignette. Across vignettes, we 
manipulated the causal framing of the relationship between 
hypothesis and evidence as well as the choice of the 
hypothesis (credible vs. incredible). Generalizability was 
controlled for by setting it to its medium value (i.e., 240 
participants). Two of the four reports involved highly 
credible hypotheses, the other two involved incredible 
hypotheses. Similarly, two of these reports used weak causal 
framing (Experiment 1 and 2: “X is associated with Y”) 
while the other two used strong causal framing (Experiment 
1: “X leads to Y”, Experiment 2: “X causes Y”). In other 
words, Experiment 1 used implicit causal language and 
Experiment 2 used explicit causal language, while the 
experiments were identical with respect to design, materials, 
and procedure. 
To account for the possible influence of the content of a 
particular report, we counterbalanced the allocation of weak 
and strong causal framing conditions to the credibility 
conditions across the items, and created two versions of the 
experiments. The order of reports was individually 
randomized for each participant. 
Participants judged each report in terms of the explanatory 
power of the hypothesis it described. Specifically, 
participants considered the statement: “The researchers’ 
hypothesis explains the results of the study”,  and expressed 
their judgments on a 7-point scale with the extremes (-3) "I 
strongly disagree" and (3) "I strongly agree", and the center 
pole (0) "I neither disagree nor agree". 
Analysis and Results 
Separate two-way ANOVAs were calculated with the 
factors Credibility (low, high) and  Causal Framing (weak, 
strong). ANOVA of Experiment 1 (implicit causal 
language) revealed a main effect of Credibility, F (1, 202) = 
84.5; p < .001; ηpart
2
 = 0.30. There was no main effect of 
Causal Framing (p = .37), and no interaction (p = .08). Pair-
wise comparisons showed that incredible hypotheses were 
rated significantly lower than credible hypotheses, 
independently of the value of Causal Framing (incredible 
hypotheses: M = 0.26; SEM = 0.10; credible hypotheses: M 
= 1.14; SEM = 0.09; t-test: t(202) = -9.2; p < 0.001; d = 
0.67). The results of Experiment 1 therefore indicate that the 
prior credibility of a hypothesis was a strong predictor of 
judgments of explanatory power (Figure 1). Instead, 
framing a hypothesis with implicit causal language did not 
have effects on explanatory judgment. 
 
 
Figure 1: Explanatory power ratings for credible and incredible 
statements in Experiment 1. Error bars show standard errors of the 
mean, and are expressed numerically, in parentheses next to the 
mean value. 
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ANOVA of Experiment 2 (explicit causal language) 
revealed main effects of Credibility (F (1, 207) = 286.9; p 
<.001; ηpart
2
 = 0.58) and Causal Framing, F (1, 207) = 31.0; 
p <.001; ηpart
2 
= 0.13, as well as a significant interaction 
Credibility х Causal Framing, F (1, 207) = 37.6; p <.001; 
ηpart
2 
= 0.15. Figure 2 shows the effect sizes and the 
interaction between both factors as well as the relevant 
descriptives. 
 
 
Figure 2: How explanatory power ratings vary with regard to 
Credibility and Causal Framing (Experiment 2). Error bars show 
standard errors of the mean and are expressed numerically, in 
parentheses next to the mean value. 
 
The results of Experiment 2 confirm that the prior 
credibility of a hypothesis is a strong predictor of judgments 
of the hypothesis’ explanatory power. Incredible hypotheses 
received negative explanatory power ratings, credible 
hypotheses receive positive ratings. The results also showed 
that explicit causal framing can increase ratings of 
explanatory power, but only for incredible hypotheses. 
While this effect may lead explanatory judgment astray, in 
most practical cases of explanatory reasoning, people are 
interested in the explanatory power of hypotheses which 
they find, at least to a certain extent, credible. As Figure 2 
shows, there was no effect of causal framing on explanatory 
power in this important case. 
This pattern of results confirms that the prior credibility of 
a hypothesis plays a gate-keeping-role in explanatory 
reasoning: only credible causal hypotheses qualify as 
explanatorily valuable. By contrast, implicit or explicit 
causal framing plays a small to negligible role in influencing 
judgments of explanatory power. 
Experiment 3: Credibility х Generalizability 
Participants, Design, and Material 
Two-hundred-seven participants (mean age 33.4 years, SD = 
9.1; 123 male) from America (n = 156), India (n = 37) and 
other countries completed Experiment 3 for a small 
monetary payment. 
The experiment resembled Experiment 1 and 2. Four 
vignettes, each of which included a headline and five 
sentences, presented credible and incredible hypotheses. 
The relation between hypothesis and evidence was 
expressed by using the causally neutral wording "X co-
occurs with Y". The critical manipulation concerned the 
sample descriptions used in the vignettes, which expressed 
either narrow or wide generalizability of the study’s result. 
For narrowly generalizable results, the second sentence of a 
report indicated that the sample of the study encompassed 
around 5 people (e.g. "The researchers studied 6 people"). 
For widely generalizable results, the sample included about 
10,000 people (wide generalizability condition, e.g. "The 
researchers studied 9891 people"). 
To control for the possible influence of the content of a 
particular report, we counterbalanced the allocation of 
narrow and wide generalizability conditions to the 
credibility conditions across the items, and created two 
versions of the experiments. The order in which reports 
were presented to the participants was individually 
randomized for each participant. 
Participants were asked to carefully assess each report 
with regard to Explanatory Power. Participants’ ratings were 
collected on 7-point scales, with the extreme poles (-3) "I 
strongly disagree" and (3) "I strongly agree", and the center 
pole (0) "I neither disagree nor agree". 
Analysis and Results 
The ratings were analyzed with a two-way ANOVA with 
the factors Credibility (low, high) and Generalizability 
(narrow, wide). ANOVA revealed significant main effects 
of Credibility, F (1, 206) = 83.830; p <.001; ηpart
2 
= 0.289; 
and Generalizability, F (1, 206) = 29.593; p < .001; ηpart
2 
= 
0.126, and no interaction Credibility х Generalizability (p = 
.085, n.s.). 
As with Experiment 1 and 2, credible hypotheses 
achieved significantly higher ratings than incredible 
hypotheses (incredible hypotheses: M = -0.01; SEM = 0.10; 
credible hypotheses: M = 0.95; SEM = 0.08; t-test: t(206) = 
-9.2; p < .001; d = 0.72). Furthermore, reports with wide 
generalizability achieved significantly higher ratings 
compared to reports with narrow generalizability (narrow: 
M = 0.21; SEM = 0.10; credible hypotheses: M = 0.73; SEM 
= 0.08; t-test: t(206) = -5.4; p < .001; d = 0.40). Figures 3 
and 4 show the main effects for both variables. 
Figure 3: Explanatory power ratings as a function of Credibility. 
Error bars show standard errors and are also expressed 
numerically, next to the mean value. 
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Figure 4: Explanatory power ratings as a function of 
Generalizability. Error bars show standard errors and are also 
expressed numerically, next to the mean value. 
Discussion 
We examined the impact of three factors---prior credibility, 
causal framing, and generalizability---on judgments of 
explanatory power. In a series of three experiments, we 
varied both the subjective credibility of an explanation and 
one of the other factors: causal framing and generalizability. 
In Experiments 1 and 2 we found that the impact of causal 
language on judgments of explanatory power was small to 
negligible. Experiment 3 showed that generalizable 
explanations with wider scope positively affected judgments 
of explanatory power. 
Across all experiments, we found that the prior subjective 
credibility of a hypothesis had a striking effect on how 
participants assessed explanatory power. In particular, the 
credibility of an explanatory hypothesis had an important 
gate-keeping function: the impact of generalizability on 
explanatory power was more significant when credibility 
was high. On the other hand, the high credibility of a 
hypothesis controlled for the potentially misleading effect of 
causal framing on explanatory judgment. 
This pattern of findings is consistent with existing 
psychological research demonstrating that people resist 
endorsing explanatory hypotheses that appear unnatural and 
unintuitive, given their background common-sense 
understanding of the physical and of the social world 
(Bloom & Weisberg 2007). Our findings are also consistent 
with the idea that stable background personal ideologies 
(often referred to as “worldview”) can reliably predict 
whether people are likely to reject well-confirmed scientific 
hypotheses  (Lewandowsky et al., 2013; Colombo, Bucher, 
& Inbar, 2016). 
So, scientific hypotheses that are inconsistent with our 
prior, background, common-sense beliefs or in tension with 
personal ideologies are likely to be judged as implausible, 
and may not be endorsed as good explanations unless they 
are supported by extra-ordinary evidence gathered by some 
trustworthy source. On the other hand, for hypotheses that 
fit our prior, background belief or ideology, we often focus 
on information that, if the candidate explanatory hypothesis 
is true, would boost its goodness (Klayman & Ha 1987). 
This kind of psychological process of biased evidence 
evaluation and retention might have led participants to give 
the highest ratings of explanatory power, across different 
experiments, when, in addition to a credible hypothesis, the 
report was widely generalizable. In comparison, the impact 
of causal framing was negligible in these cases. This result 
confirms that a good explanation has to be credible and 
widely generalizable, and that credible, widely generalizable 
explanations are not subject to misleading causal framing 
effects. 
The interplay we observed between prior credibility and 
explanatory power is also relevant to understanding the 
relationship between abductive and probabilistic reasoning. 
Highly credible hypotheses were sensitive to the effects of 
factors which are usually considered explanatory virtues like 
the generalizability of an explanation. 
In abductive reasoning, explanatory considerations are 
taken to boost the credibility of a target hypothesis while 
inducing a sense of understanding (Lipton, 2004). Previous 
psychological studies investigated the effect on people’s 
assessments of explanatory power of factors like simplicity 
(Lombrozo, 2007; Bonawitz & Lombrozo, 2012) and 
coherence (Koslowski et al. 2008). Our results advance this 
body of literature by suggesting that the generalizability of a 
hypothesis will boost the acceptability of the hypothesis, 
when the hypothesis has a high prior subjective credibility. 
High prior credibility may also insulate an explanation 
from causal framing effects, which may produce a deceptive 
sense of understanding leading to erroneous explanatory 
judgments (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002; Trout, 2002). 
Overall, our experiments show that explanatory power is 
a complex concept, affected by considerations of prior 
credibility of a (causal) hypothesis, and its generalizability. 
These factors also figure prominently in (normative) 
philosophical theories of explanation. For instance, the D-N 
model (Hempel, 1965) stresses the generality of the 
proposed explanation, and the causal-mechanical account 
(Woodward, 2003) requires a credible causal mechanism. 
On the other hand, the multitude of relevant factors in 
explanatory judgment explains why it has been difficult to 
come up with a theory of abductive inference that is both 
normatively compelling and descriptively accurate: after all, 
it is difficult to fit diverse determinants of explanatory 
judgment into a single unifying framework. In that spirit, we 
hope that our results will promote an interdisciplinary 
conversation between empirical evidence and philosophical 
theorizing, and about the “prospects for a naturalized 
philosophy of explanation” in particular (Lombrozo 2011, 
549; Schupbach, 2015; Colombo, 2016). 
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